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As a result of a patient having initially plunged her analyst into a great silence, 
paradoxically, we have an account of the subsequent analytic treatment that has the 
makings of a nineteenth century novel in its capaciousness. In therapy, as elsewhere, 
life needs ample room to come into its own and, as much an orchestrator as an author 
on this occasion, Franco Borgogno has put together a remarkably inventive text, The 
Girl Who Committed Hara-Kiri, on early infantile trauma and the borderline 
psychotic transference. Borgogno makes an explicit claim on the analytic community 
for a ‘polyphonic’ response in his chapter on ‘Little Hans’, which, in light of the 
“groundbreaking and dramatic content” (p. 255) of Eissler’s interviews with Max and 
Herbert Graf, includes a postscript to an earlier paper of Borgogno’s on Freud’s case 
history. Beyond this particular case, however, the claim on the many voices of 
psychoanalysis may be seen as something of an organizing principle in a series of 
dialogues on history and intergenerational trauma, the intrapsychic and 
intersubjective, transformation and witnessing, spoilt children, and working-through 
with patients who are difficult to reach. 
 Multiple rather than selective, indeed many-voiced rather than eclectic, the 
form of the book ideally expresses the author’s longstanding commitment to the 
dialogical nature of psychoanalysis. Dostoevsky isn’t quiet the right model here. 
Dickens and Stevenson are probably closer to the mark; in fact, a quote from Great 
Expectations provides the epigraph for the second part of the book and Dickens, 
whose David Copperfield Borgogno quotes elsewhere in relation to abandonment and 
orphanage, could be seen as the guiding spirit in a book that has urgent things to say 
about family violence and the ill-treatment of children. I favour Dickens therefore as 
the appropriate model, although in the interview with the author from 2010 that closes 
the book, Borgogno himself nominates the Spanish poet Antonio Machado and the 
Portuguese writer José Saramago as “the ones who express the spirit with which I 
have gathered my thoughts in these pages” (p. 327). The stress on spirit (Dickensian 
or otherwise) is the important point, insofar as it alerts us to ‘journeys’ and 
‘conversation’ as the twin enthusiasms that animate the collection. 
 A wayfarer (to borrow Machado’s term) with a seemingly prodigious appetite 
for dialogue, Borgogno has put together a book based on the basic idea that as 
analysts we are engaged in ongoing conversations with our patients, but also with our 
colleagues and ourselves. Analysis is understood as “a special experience of 
conversation in which one is listened to, understood, and, overall, in which one 
obtains a response” (p. 330). For Borgogno, “responsive listening” (p. 339) is the sine 
qua non of the analytic frame of mind and, indeed, the book may be seen as a 
contribution to moves abroad to open psychoanalysis to a new experience of 
responsiveness and listening. Faimberg’s idea of ‘listening to listening’ is referred to 
in passing (p. 238), Parsons on ‘listening out, listening in’ may be added for good 
measure, and we may wish to look yet further afield in order to weigh psychoanalysis 
as an act of attention that credits the patient’s contribution. 
 Borgogno identifies responsive listening with a relational or bi-personal 
analytic perspective and, in his dialogue with Dina Vallino on deprivation and “spoilt 
children” (cf. Chapter 7), emphasizes that the therapeutic task in this case involves 
“transforming a violent turbulence into a friendly conversation about extremely 
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painful events” (p. 219). We look forward to hearing more from the author on what he 
means by “a conversation among friends” (p. 218). Meanwhile, the importance placed 
on conversation throughout the book is confirmed by Peter Rudnytsky’s subtle and 
intelligent foreword, in which he acknowledges the far-reaching implications of 
conversations at the crossroads. Rudnytsky, who shares the author’s approach to 
analysis, orientates readers with respect to the encounter between the man of pain and 
the shade of the Theban prophet standing there in the House of Death. Aptly placed 
by way of classical analogy, we are therefore introduced to a particular landscape, the 
‘psychic climate’ or ‘atmosphere’ of which Borgogno describes in these essays along 
the central axes of deprivation, nullification and revivification. 
 Of course, there is a danger that the metaphor of the ‘journey’ is too easily 
achieved and that ‘psychoanalysis as a journey’ sounds too glib. Nevertheless, 
Rudnytsky reminds us that the master of exploits may be permitted to return home on 
the condition that, when an oar is perceived as a fan that separates chaff from grain, 
he recognizes what it means. The encounter that leaves Odysseus with word of his 
own death, gentle and painless as it might be, necessitates another journey. Borgogno 
(p. 328) quotes Saramago to this end: “O fim duma viagem é apenas o começo doutra 
(The end of one journey is simply the start of another)”. And while the Homeric epic 
describes a destination, if not a destiny, marked by a sign the meaning of which lies 
somewhere farther down the road, The Girl who Committed Hara-Kiri is presented 
without a conclusion, indeed, with an eye to the ‘analyst of tomorrow’. 
 To spell out the implicit link in the author’s guiding enthusiasms, the 
presupposition of meaning in the conjunction of signs and destination, including, the 
play of recognition and misrecognition, denotes Freud’s basic insight that talking can 
change not only what we believe, but how we believe it. Far from an alternative to the 
‘talking cure’, the “interacting cure” (p. 293), as Borgogno describes it, is an integral 
part of the Freudian field. Freud certainly isn’t the hero of Borgogno’s story, but he is 
nonetheless the unavoidable source. That a conversation between two people – a 
gathering of ghosts if you will – might fundamentally change the structure of the 
human psyche constitutes Borgogno’s point of departure as an analyst. Readers will 
decide whether in this case it is a matter of returning home or taking leave for a yet 
unknown destination (Odysseus or Abraham). In any case, given the author’s central 
preoccupation with the dissociation of ‘infant souls’, we might add the Dantean 
journey among the dead and the lost souls in Dante’s Hell in support of the wager as 
well as the main theme of the book, namely, that psychic change, insofar as it 
revivifies or stirs patients to life, leaves room for new futures as an open-ended 
promise of renewal. 
 Treading in Michael Balint’s footsteps, Borgogno envisages the possibility of 
a new beginning in the transference, which, as Balint demonstrated with the use he 
made of the patient’s regression, involves going back to a point before the ‘basic 
fault’ (or ‘spoilage’ to use Borgogno’s preferred term) as a condition not only of the 
patient’s changed relation with the analyst, but also of more fundamental character 
changes. Here, as elsewhere, Borgogno confirms that the Independent tradition of 
English psychoanalysis, whose founding practitioners are among his main points of 
reference, is essentially a type of character analysis. We can do with a reminder that 
‘character’ and ‘self’ aren’t synonymous terms, while also keeping the reference to 
‘soul’ in play. In this respect, Borgogno brings a good deal of clarity to the debate 
about Independent psychoanalysis today; at the same time, the historic link between 
Balint and Ferenczi comes across, particularly, in the discussion of “preverbal 
traumatic events” (p. 288) and the “primitive transference” (p. 285). If the explicit 
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preoccupation with the metaphor of the ‘journey’ is Homeric in ways that Rudnytsky 
suggests, the epic becomes a specific historical response on the post-Freudian grounds 
of character analysis. 
 We come away from the book, then, convinced that the model for 
‘psychoanalysis as a journey’ is irreducibly Freudian, even as it takes its bearings 
from Ferenczi, Bion, Paula Heimann, Racker, Winnicott and others. Generally 
speaking, Borgogno inherits Freud’s own radical sense of belatedness in presenting 
this highly inventive, multilayered book as an open dialogue with the Freudian 
tradition. The journey that Borgogno proposes for psychoanalysis involves keeping 
“the Freudian tradition alive” (p. 346), which means deepening our practice even as 
“the heart of the Freudian method remains alive” (p. 351). We are reminded by the 
clinical discussions, which comprise the first six chapters, that one is already belated 
at every turn in psychoanalysis. This is brought home by the overall ambition of the 
book to stand as “testimony to [a] way of being a psychoanalyst” (p. 327). Once 
again, the defiant, libertarian spirit of Saramago is at hand, with reference to the 
prolongation of the journey through memory, recollection and narrative. Or as 
Machado would have it in his altogether more plaintive, lyrical mode: “caminante, no 
hay camino, / se hace camino al andar (Wayfarer, there is no way, / You make the 
way as you go)”. 
 Borgogno effectively runs poetizing (ein Dichten) and thinking (ein Denken) 
together, in what amounts to a quintessential Freudian gesture, by constructing the 
journey, retrospectively, in the very act of testifying or bearing witness. André Haynal 
rates the book, at once, stimulating and formidable; let’s say that it achieves what it 
does by equating the rhetorical, figural use of retrospection and prolongation with the 
clinical work of witnessing and revivification. The book, in other words, is alive to 
what it says; metaphor becomes an ontological issue in the company of a seasoned 
traveller, if not a journeyman, for whom “there is no way” save the labour of 
expressing it in stories about where we find ourselves. The testimony thus brings the 
semblance of a journey into view for analysts and patients alike. If this is what Haynal 
means by ‘formidable’, then I tend to agree with his estimation. That metaphor is 
integral to reality, be it in dreams, symptoms or enactments, never ceases to inspire us 
as analysts. 
 Although having said that, it isn’t entirely clear to me whether we are meant to 
understand the journey-as-testimony in terms of the temporality of nachträglichkeit. 
The question is worth pondering. Personally, I remain unconvinced that constructions 
in analysis, as Freud defined matters in 1937, are qualitatively different from what 
Borgogno describes here as the recovery of an “unsymbolized and inaccessible 
historical past” (p. 287). This is hardly a quibble. The question of construction, in 
many ways, is at the heart of Borgogno’s theory of clinical technique; it has a direct 
bearing on what he has to say about role-reversal, working as a witness, therapeutic 
enactments, communicational interaction, and so on. As things stand, one would be 
hard pushed to trace the source of these important technical innovations back to 
Freud. And yet if we allow that the radical import of Freud’s late work turns on the 
distinction between ‘recollection’ and ‘construction’, then surely psychic 
revivification, bringing the patient “back to life” (p. 286) emotionally and 
psychologically in the analytic encounter, is indebted to Freud’s idea of constructions 
that compel ‘conviction’ (überzeugung) as memories. 
 There is room for readers to alight on any number of points in this wide-
ranging collection. I have singled out the question of construction, together with the 
therapeutic aim of psychic revival, on account of its central importance in Borgogno’s 
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treatment of borderline patients; but the agon with Freud pertains throughout. This is 
evident, for instance, in the attitude the author adopts in favour of non-technical 
language coupled with his fundamental misgivings about “theoretical and clinical 
dynasties” (p. 335). Certinaly, the essays have nothing much to offer readers with a 
predilection for formulaic thinking, and even less to those who allow dogma to settle 
matters. Borgogno parts company with certain schools of thought on these grounds, 
taking issue with arrogance and obfuscation where he perceives them to be. The 
critique is levelled at “the jargon of the establishment”, but also at “the hypocritical 
and moralistic aspects that dwell in us” (p. 304). For example, Max Graf is included 
among the fathers alongside Freud, whose ‘authoritarianism’ Borgogno seeks to 
challenge. 
 And yet while the critical attitude towards authority seems entirely consistent 
throughout the chapters, there is nonetheless an important distinction to be made here. 
The underlying critique of instrumentalism running through the clinical discussions as 
well as the historical essays is wide-ranging and, usefully, extends to self-criticism. 
As such, it offers a timely warning for an analytic community courting approbation 
and accreditation from various governmental sources. Borgogno’s own efforts in 
establishing links between psychoanalysis and the university are worth considering in 
this light. Of course psychoanalysis is in the world and has no choice but to remain 
there; this doesn’t mean, however, that it must succumb to market forces. To the 
contrary, Borgogno reminds us by clinical example that the analyst has a critical role 
to play in the world. 
 The polemic, on the other hand, is aimed squarely at Freud’s imperious 
bearing and, in particular, his “intransigence and indifference towards those who did 
not fall into line with his ideas” (p. 257). The criticism surfaces overtly in the chapter 
on ‘Little Hans’, but is otherwise pervasive. One can hear between the lines the 
verdict of Jung and others that Freud placed authority above truth. Can we envisage 
any kind of standing for psychoanalysis, beyond a collection of private sects (not such 
a farfetched idea as we look around us), without the instruction provided for by the 
authority of tradition? The author certainly doesn’t mean to flatter anyone or to 
compromise his enthusiasm with false humility. Nevertheless, we tend not to get very 
far in these essays with the crucial distinction between compliance and assent, or with 
Newman’s distinction between notional assent and real assent. This is too 
consequential a matter to adumbrate without further comment and, to be sure, it 
behoves the author to provide grounds for the rehearsal of familiar controversies. 
 Moving on from the critical tenor of the essays, the positive point is that 
Borgogno eschews systematic argument in favour of a largely felicitous series of 
scattered thoughts (pensieri sparsi), including, a record of his ongoing engagement 
with analytic colleagues. While his thinking tends to sprawl and spread itself out in 
surprising and often unpredictable ways; at the same time, the author encourages by 
clinical example the play of creative muddle and provisional remedies through a 
rough and ready attitude towards the experience of conversation. This principled 
approach is maintained primarily in a declared commitment to patients, a therapeutic 
combination of identification and respect with regards to the ‘rights’ and ‘reasons’ of 
patients (p. 237); hence the aim of holding patients in safety, as far as one can, until 
such time as they feel more confident about making their way in the world. 
Furthermore, in responding directly to the question of ethics in psychoanalysis, 
Borgogno emphasizes the rights of children; he allows for the initial interpersonal 
relationship as the primordial source of justice; and he counts the omission of 
assistance as the principal ethical problem of psychoanalysis. The idea that assistance 
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assembles us in justice as a spontaneous, primordial gesture, places him closer to the 
tradition of Augustine and Aquinas than to the Freudian-Lacanian ethos of tragic 
necessity. And he is clearly committed to this idea: “All my psychoanalytic 
reflections have been inspired by this concept of the omission of help and by the 
search for new theoretical and clinical avenues to improve our capacity to assist 
another mind” (p. 350). 
 An expansive, exploratory thinker, then, Borgogno’s work is best experienced 
and enjoyed in its kaleidoscopic search free from the constraints of systematization. 
At one point, he excuses himself and his present interlocutor, Dian Vallino, asking for 
clemency on account of their having “wandered a bit too far in [their] observations on 
the points discussed” (p. 230). I imagine readers who have followed him this far will 
be only too grateful for the characteristic quality of his thought to go astray. 
Admittedly, there were occasions when I felt the want of a sterner editorial hand. For 
example, due to the amalgamation of two previously published papers, the case of M 
is actually presented twice in Chapter 9 and, indeed, there is a limit to the number of 
times the same clinical material can be presented in a single volume. When polyphony 
becomes repetition readers will inevitably tire. And yet for the most part, we are the 
obvious beneficiaries of Borgogno’s willingness to follow his nose without restraint. 
In the event, the reader spends a good deal of time with the author off the beaten 
track. And if we allow ourselves to roam through the chapters in the convivial 
company of a “lively and vibrant thinker” (p. 19), then in my view there is a lot to be 
gained from an open-handed temperament combined with an independence that 
doesn’t place any special claim on the title. 
 I think I have probably said enough to give a flavour of the tenor and temper 
of the book and its overall tone of conviviality. It is important to stress the latter as it 
sets the analyst against nihilism. At this point, however, I should put the question: 
what does Borgogno argue for? I doubt the author would thank me for proposing now 
to schematize his argument. Inevitably, the schema is given at some obvious cost to 
the clinical detail, and yet beyond the obvious fact of our different temperaments, I 
also want to acknowledge that Borgogno isn’t simply wandering about in these essays 
without a fixed course. As he says himself, we require theory “in order to frame the 
clinical facts of a session or of a period of analysis” (p. 343), even if these theories 
“remain in the background” as we go on reflecting on our clinical experience. I take 
this to mean that analysts rely on the compass of theory without allowing it to become 
the last word, and of course theory plays a part in rendering the ‘journey’ what it 
appears to be. Turning to Borgogno’s argument, then, I suggest it consists of three 
main concerns: the depriving situation; psychic deadness; and revivification. Let me 
now try to illustrate this schematic reading with reference to the main chapter. 
 The book begins with the most recent version of a case presentation, the case 
of M, which has appeared on a number of occasions and in various contexts dating 
back over some twenty years. The question of why the author should return 
continually to this case is acknowledged but left answered. It may be that no answer is 
available to the author that isn’t essentially banal. We learn that Borgogno presented 
the case in order to qualify as a training and supervising analyst of the Società 
Psicoanalitica Italiana in 1994-1995; that he thinks of M as a “special patient” (p. 
xxi); and that he considers the chapter in which the case is presented “the heart of the 
book” (p. 4). M is variously described as a borderline and a schizoid-deprived patient, 
whose treatment is set out here in relation to a series of dreams. Borgogno treats the 
young woman’s dreams as “exact reproductions of a relational pattern that is anti-vital 
and pathogenic” (p. 32), starting with the dream the patient brings to her first session. 
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The dreams, therefore, are seen as a means of working-through actual traumatic 
events (p. 60). And we are told that not long after recounting the dream of a Japanese 
person committing hara-kiri, which the author refers to as “a sort of calling card” (p. 
5), the patient remained almost completely silent and withdrawn for nearly four years. 
 Although it isn’t possible here to recount the treatment in any detail, the 
patient’s dream of hara-kiri in a cloister provides the analyst with a psychic sounding 
throughout the analysis. This isn’t to say that the dream-life of the claustrum 
alleviates the analyst’s feelings of uselessness and ineptitude (p. 186), or spares him 
from doubting whether it is worth going on with the analysis (p. 224). To the contrary, 
the despair and devastation of the patient’s inner life, as Slavin puts it, “gets into 
him…into his deepest self” (p. 112). Based on this experience of impotence in the 
countertransference, Borgogno posits the notion of “role-reversal” with respect to a 
non-neurotic type of repetitious enactment. In particular, he describes a 
“correspondence” (p. 293) in the transference-countertransference between the 
analyst’s identification with the dissociated and split-off infantile part of the patient 
and the patient’s pathological identification with a devitalized object. 
 Concentrating exclusively on the pathological meaning of the negative, the 
author proposes it is the “inversion of roles” (p. 286) that renders the “deletion at the 
heart of representation” discernable as “a marker of negativity” (Green, 1999, p. 197). 
How the patient is helped out of the “black hole” (p. 275) into which she appears to 
have fallen, is essentially what Borgogno sets out to describe in the chapter. And he 
insists that “the analyst must be more hopeful than the patient” (p. 7), while at the 
same time emphasizing the restorative function of working-through in the here-and-
now as well as the “long wave” of the analysis. Here, he acknowledges the seminal 
contribution of Irma Brenman Pick and others, but goes on to elaborate things more 
specifically in terms of “the analyst’s function as a living witness” (p. 137). Working-
through, therefore, is seen essentially as a work of reclamation in the face of profound 
failure. 
 In making an assessment of his own contribution to clinical thinking, 
Borgogno (pp. 336-40) singles out the “relational journey of working-through”; the 
analyst’s “witnessing function”; and the theory of “spoilt children”. He also includes 
the theory of “role-reversal”, which, insofar as it presupposes working as a witness in 
the long haul of the treatment, seems to me to crystallize his argument. Faced with a 
type of blank pain manifest in the patient’s withdrawn state: her “complaining, 
sighing, and moaning…session after session” (pp. 277-8), the “agonic scene” in 
which the analyst finds himself affords access to an unconscious identification with 
the lifeless mother, a “lethal, abusing, depriving object” (p. 215) that makes it 
impossible for the patient to learn how to live. And by ‘access’ I am not referring to 
projective identification so much as “the affective response of the analyst to the 
patient’s communications” (King, 1978), the reason being that Borgogno emphasizes 
the role the analyst is forced into by the patient as distinct from the feelings being 
projected into the analyst. 
 The distinction won’t necessarily stand up to scrutiny in some quarters but, 
nevertheless, the author proposes “projective exteriorizations” (p. 177) as occasions of 
personification, where the analyst finds himself “in the place of” (p. 212) the patient, 
responding in the manner of a “double” (César and Sára Botella, 2005). Although not 
elaborated theoretically, the clinical discussion of personification nonetheless points 
towards the idea of sympathetic attention based on the equivalences of identification. 
In the case of M, Borgogno argues that the patient was forced as a young child to 
witness her parents’ failure to live and, correspondingly, the analyst is forced to stand 
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aside helplessly while his patient’s life comes to nothing. The case history thus 
affords valuable glimpses into the use patients make of the analyst as a useless object. 
It is important to differentiate this idea from contributions that are otherwise similar. 
In particular, I don’t think the ‘fear of breakdown’ adequately covers the unthinkable 
experience of nullification, understood as the negative of the trauma, where 
something has not happened that should have done. Borgogno treats the latter in terms 
of the failure of life that repeatedly devastates. Anyone who has made contact in their 
therapeutic work with the conviction of catastrophe will value what the author has to 
say. 
 I have some questions, however. And I will restrict myself to a couple of 
points concerning identification and perception. For Borgogno, the analyst as 
impotent witness to the failure of life, that is, in the wake of the child’s experience, is 
more important therapeutically than the analyst as murderous parent. But do we have 
to view this necessarily as a categorical distinction? The author pushes the claim in a 
dialogue with Jonathan Sklar that suggests two contrasting readings of Ferenczi: 
“Sklar…considers the most painful aspect for us analysts in these circumstances to be 
the fact of finding ourselves in the role of the murderous parent…whilst to my mind 
the most difficult element to bear is the intensity of the pain that a child feels when 
faced with such a parent” (p. 173). The claim is reiterated in a later chapter on 
Ferenczi as the “introjective psychoanalyst” par excellence (p. 305), although this 
tends to raise yet more questions about the nature of identification in Borgogno’s 
argument. The chapter, which is intended as a demonstration of “the similarities 
between Ferenczi and Winnicott” (p. 298), advances its argument, partly at least, on 
the grounds that Klein’s theory of primitive mental states is not “supported by 
sufficient identification” (p. 300) with infants and young children. What the author 
means by this extraordinary claim becomes clearer in the following chapter, namely, 
that Klein wasn’t “very attentive to what might be the needs of infants or their real 
problems” (p. 332). This is an unfortunate line of argument and, if the aim is to clarify 
the links between Ferenczi and Winnicott, then it’s hardly incidental that Klein was 
analyzed by Ferenczi and that Winnicott was a post-Kleinian. 
 On a further and no less consequential matter, while there is a brief reference 
to the analyst’s “work of figurability” and the retrogressive movement of his mind in 
tandem with the patient’s regression (p. 323n43), I think there is a more rigorous link 
to be made between working as a double (travail en double) and the analyst 
functioning or working as a witness. Personally, I don’t see how this link could be 
made without recourse to a metapsychological reappraisal of the psychical activity of 
perception, including, “the value of the perceptual in relation to temporality”; at the 
same time “taking into account not only the representational transference-
countertransference elements and the conflicts between the agencies, but also the 
processes, the psychic movements traversing both psyches at every level” (Botella 
and Botella, 2005, pp. 176-8). 
 Taking stock, then, I think we can extrapolate the main aspects of Borgogno’s 
clinical argument from his theory of role-reversal: the aetiology of borderline states; 
the phenomenology of the negative; and the borderline psychotic transference. The 
aetiological argument attributes primacy to environmental deficiency; 
intergenerational trauma; psychic and historic disinheritance; and the psychosocial 
dynamic of deprivation-spoliation in the context of the family situation. The negative 
states of mind to which the author proposes the internal as well as the external aspects 
of these factors give rise, are identified under the heading of “psychic death” (cf. 
chapter 6). The phenomenology of despair, perhaps Borgogno’s most moving 
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contribution, is reconstructed on the basis of this all pervasive sense of inner 
nothingness in the transference. In terms of treatment, the analyst is faced with the 
task of helping the patient find new possibilities for turning a bad start to some 
account, a long-term therapeutic endeavour with no guarantees that Borgogno 
envisages as a process of revivification. It seems appropriate that we end with an 
example of the interaction between patient and analyst along these lines, where “a 
space rich in new possibilities unexpectedly opens up” (p. 167). 
 During the fifth year in the analysis of M, the analyst interpreted the patient’s 
identification with a mother who “hated life” and his role as the child in the company 
of such a mother. “I explicitly displayed my feelings”, he explains, “as the object of 
her transference through a rumbling, vehement interpretation” (p. 15). The patient, 
who seems to have been “visibly moved” by the quality of the interpretation, is 
quoted as saying: “If you discover that you have an effect on other people, you feel 
real; you feel that you exist; therefore, others also exist for you and are real. That is 
what you give me. It’s not an indistinct or irritating noise…It’s something that comes 
rumbling from inside, which is alive and not dead at all, something that makes you 
feel reborn” (p. 16). 
 Where does the reference to ‘rumbling’ come from? Together, the “rumbling 
interpretation” and the patient’s vital response came in the wake of yet another long 
period of silence and withdrawal, following an “atypical sequence of sessions” (p. 
13). During the course of these sessions the patient describes having “squared up” to 
an obstructive internal object (the analyst in the transference), and shortly afterwards 
a vehicle passes by outside the consulting room, “making a loud rumble” (p. 11). 
We’re told the patient started at the sound, in response to which the analyst made the 
following intervention: “A rhombus in answer to the square” (p. 11). While the play 
on words doesn’t work in English; the Italian rombo, as Borgogno reminds us, is the 
same word for ‘rumble’ and ‘rhombus’. The patient seemed rather delighted by the 
phrase, telling her analyst that the word rombo (‘rumble’) “was really you” (p. 11). 
For Borgogno, the episode in the later session may be seen as mutative against the 
background of the previous material and, moreover, in the context of the analytic 
work on and within silence (p. 136). As such, “the rumble/rhombus took shape as a 
shared term in the lexicon of our symbolic intercourse” (p. 18). For Sklar the sound of 
sense, in this case, is what matters (p. 148); whereas Goretti Regazzoni emphasizes 
the interplay of the signifier and the signified (p. 55). Typically, Borgogno invites this 
kind of exchange between colleagues, even where there is general agreement that 
having been rumbled from the inside, the patient seems to have found new 
possibilities for a vivid life of her own. 
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